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Reber: In re Cox' Estate

RECENT DECISIONS
HUSBAND WHO MURDERS WIFE AND COMMITS SUICIDE PREVENTED FROM
ASSERTING SURVIVORSHIP RIGHT IN JOINT TENANCY AND HOLDS HALF-

INTEREST AS CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTEE FOR WIFE'S HEIRS; HIS HEIRS INHERIT

His HALF. - Husband and wife owned real property jointly with each having heirs by a previous marriage. The wife was shot and killed by the
husband, who immediately committed suicide. Although she predeceased
her husband, the wife's heirs claimed her half-interest in the joint property for her estate. The husband's heirs filed a petition to determine to
whom distribution of her half-interest should be made. They claimed
that at the instant the wife was killed the husband became sole owner of
the joint property, and when he committed suicide they inherited all of
the property. The district court, sitting in probate without a jury, found
that the husband bad unlawfully and feloniously killed his wife. The
husband was held an involuntary trustee of the wife's half-interest in the
joint property for the benefit of her estate.1 The husband's heirs appealed
to the Montana Supreme Court, held, affirmed. Justice and equity
demand that a man cannot benefit by his own wrong. This principle precludes a felonious killer from acquiring, by survivorship, his victim's
share of property owned jointly. This rule applies also to the murderer's
estate, and his heirs may only inherit his half-interest. In re Cox' Estate,
380 P.2d 584 (Mont. 1963) (Mr. Justice Doyle dissented. Mr. Justice
Adair dissented without opinion).
As a general rule property may not be acquired by a person who
feloniously murders its owner. Founded on the equitable doctrine that
a man cannot benefit by his own wrong, this rule is applied where title
to property and the benefits of ownership pass from the victim to the
murderer, who is then deprived of these interests because of his unlawful
acquisition.2 However, where one joint tenant murders the other, title to
the property held jointly and the benefits of ownership do not pass from
the victim to the murderer because of well-established property rules
peculiar to joint ownership.
A joint tenancy is created by a conveyance of property which vests
'In the instant case the criminal determination was made in a civil proceeding. In
the absence of a statute requiring a conviction of criminal homicide in order to
prevent a murderer from taking property from his victim, the fact that a criminal
act has occurred may be established in a civil proceeding. A civil action to determine
property rights between private individuals requires a preponderance of the evidence
to establish criminal guilt, whereas a criminal action requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The result of either action is not binding on the other. See generally 4
Scorr, TRusTs § 492.4 (2d ed. 1956).
-For example, a legatee or devisee who murders his testator is prevented from taking
property under the will of his victim. See Annot., 36 A.L.R. 2d 960 (1954). For
application of the rule in other situations, see: Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 477 (1955) (heir
murders his ancestor); Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 987 (1952) (beneficiary murders his insured). Thirty-four states have enacted statutes containing this rule. Although not
uniform in the types of property to which they apply, they generally require a conviction. The statutes are collected in 4 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 492 (2d ed. 1956); Wade,
Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49 HARv.
L. REV. 715 (1936).
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title to the whole of the property in each of the tenants. 3 During their
joint lives each tenant holds a half-interest entitling him to share the
profit and enjoyment of the property with his cotenant. Each tenant
also has a survivorship right which entitles him to succeed to the exelusive use of the entire property by surviving the other tenant. Upon
the death of one tenant, the interest of the deceased continues in the
survivor by force of the survivorship right. By the common law theory
this survivor merely succeeds to an interest to which he was already entitled.4 These property law principles, expressly provided for by statute,5
permit no exception to the operation of survivorship upon the death of
one tenant.
Where one joint tenant murders the other, the courts are presented
with a dilemma: should a strict application of property rights yield
to the public policy consideration that a man-cannot benefit by his own
wrong. The murderer has defeated his victim's survivorship right, and
his claim of survivorship is founded on his unlawful act. Such a result
is "abhorrent to even the most rudimentary sense of justice." 6 Justice
Cardozo suggested that the public policy consideration outbalances property rights in these instances because: "[T]he social interest served in
refusing the criminal to profit by his crime is greater than that served
'7
by the preservation and enforcement of legal rights of ownership."
These considerations have motivated a majority of jurisdictions to
find that a murderer does in fact acquire additional interests upon the
death of his victim. However, there is a split of authority on the extent
of these additional interests.8 One view divests the murderer of all
interests in the joint property. Another view permits him to retain only
a life-interest in half of the property. The recent trend of authority
divides the property between the murderer and the estate of his victim.
In the instant ease the Montana court applied public policy considerations in refusing to enforce a murderer's statutory survivorship right.
The determination that the husband had intentionally9 killed his wife,
'Joint tenancy and tenancy by the entirety will be considered together for purposes
of this article. In both, title to the whole of the property and the right of survivorship vest in each tenant at the time of the original conveyance. Similiarities and
distinctions are pointed out in 26 Am. JuR. Husband & Wife § 66 (1940).
'TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 282 (3d ed. 1940).
REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 67-310 provides: '"In all conveyances of real
property made in joint tenancy or to tenants in estates by entirety, where the right
of survivorship is contained in the grant of such conveyance, the right of survivorship
is hereby expressly declared to exist by virtue of such grant."
See Hennigh v.
Hennigh, 131 Mont. 372, 309 P.2d 1022 (1957). REVISED CODES OF MONTANA are
hereinafter cited R.C.M.
ONeiman v. Hurff, 11 N.J. 55, 93 A.2d 345, 347 (1952). Similiar language was used
in the instant case at page 587: "Suffice it to say that we decline to follow the
reasoning supporting any interpretation fraught with consequences so pernicious and
so abhorrent to the sense of justice, equity, and morality entertained by what we
are pleased to believe is the overwhelming majority of thoughtful and moral people."
'CARDOZO, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 43 (1921).
'Discussed note 18 infra et seq. If the courts can find additional benefits passing
to the murderer, instead of an automatic right of survivorship, it becomes much easier
to deprive the murderer of all or a portion of these benefits.
'An intentional criminal homicide is prerequisite to the application of the doctrine that
a person cannot benefit by his own wrong. The killer 's motive is irrelevant: ''It is
immaterial whether he killed for the purpose of getting the property or fqr some

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol25/iss1/6

2

1963]

Reber: In re Cox' Estate
RECENT DECISIONS

"was a controlling factor [which could not] be disregarded in a just
determination of the case." 10 For this reason, the petitioner's argument
that the survovirship statute1 should be strictly enforced, was rejected.
The court ruled that the survivorship statute was controlled by the equit2
able maxim that a person cannot benefit by his own wrong.' The opin:13
ion states
If we accept the petitioner's view, then we must believe that the
Legislature contemplated a situation where a joint owner would
feloniously kill the other joint owner, thereby taking all, and
approved such a result. We cannot believe that such an abhorrent result was contemplated by the Legislature.
The court therefore construed the survivorship statute to prevent the
murderer from acquiring the half-interest of his victim.
Justice Doyle dissented, feeling that any exception to the statutory
survivorship right must come from the legislature.' 4 A minority of jurisdictions are in accord with this view, holding that the murderer is en-5
titled to all of the joint property even though he kills his cotenant.
These courts rely on the common law rule that a survivor acquires no
new interest on the death of the cotenant. Any limitation would cause
a forfeiture.' 6 Public policy with respect to disposition of property has
already been declared in survivorship statutes, and any change by the
court would encroach upon legislative functions. The Ohio court reflected this view and noted that, ". . . a public policy however sound
cannot take away from the individual his vested rights."' 7
other motive. He has in fact acquired property as a result of his criminal act, and
the inequity and impolicy of letting him retain it exist, even though he killed in a
3 BOGERT, TRUSTS &
moment of anger and at once thereafter committed suicide."
TRUSTEES § 478 (2d ed. 1960). The killer will not be barred from taking property
if he was insane at the time of the homicide. In re Eckhardt's Estate, 54 N.Y.S.2d
484 (1945); Anderson v. Grasberg, 247 Minn. 538, 78 N.W.2d 450 (1956).
"Instant case at 586.
nSee note 5 supra.
"IR.C.M. 1947, § 49-109 provides, "No one can take advantage of his own wrong."
"Instant case at 587.
"Mr. Justice Doyle said at page 589: "The court by this decision usurps the realm
reserved for the Legislature .... The law itself made no exception and it was not the
province of this court to read into the law something which it did not and does not
contain. ''
"5Beddingfield v. Estill, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S.W. 108 (1907); Wenker v. Landon, 161
Ore. 265, 88 P.2d 971 (1939); In re Foster's Estate, 182 Kan. 315, 320 P.2d 855
(1958).
"Constitutions or statutes in most jurisdictions provide that no conviction of crime
shall cause forfeiture of property. See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. III, § 9, and R.C.M.
1947, § 94-4725. The weight of authority has rejected this argument and holds that
there is no forfeiture because the property never vested in the murderer. See Bradley v. Fox, 7 Ill. 2d 106, 129 N.E.2d 699 (1955) overruling Welsh v. James, 408 Ill.
18, 95 N.E.2d 872 (1951). This weight of authority reasons that the doctrine that
a man cannot benefit by his own wrong does not deprive the murderer of property,
but merely prevents him from acquiring benefits as a result of his unlawful act.
This distinction might not be necessary because forfeiture is not meant to shield
unjust enrichment but to protect the citizen against oppressions of the sovereign.
Houser v. Haven, 32 Tenn. App. 670, 225 S.W.2d 559 (1949). For a discussion see
Comment, 17 MD. L. REV. 45 (1957).
'Shuman v. Schick, 95 Ohio App. 413, 120 N.E.2d 330, 332 (1953). In this case the
fact of the killing was undisputed. However, by committing suicide, the murderer
prevented the application of a statute requiring a conviction before he could be
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The New York courts have gone to the other extreme, and divest a
murderer who has committed suicide of all interests in the joint property.18 Property law is ignored by regarding the murderer as if he had
no joint property interests prior to the murder. Under this view all of
the joint property passes to the estate of the victim.
In the instant case, adoption of either of the foregoing positions
would have precluded a division of the joint property. Either the husband's heirs or the wife's heirs would have inherited all of the property.
The majority of jurisdictions have sought to give effect to public
policy considerations and at the same time preserve the nature of joint
ownership, as a property law concept. The recent trend of authority has
accomplished this by dividing the joint property between the estates of
by Missouri, 19
both murderer and victim. This solution has been adopted
24
23
22
21
20
California.25
and
Illinois,
Florida, Kentucky, Indiana, Michigan,
Examining the nature of joint ownership in terms of the doctrine
that a man cannot benefit by his own wrong, the Illinois court said:26
That policy would be thwarted by a blind adherence to the legal
fiction that a joint tenant holds the entire property at the date of
the original conveyance, and acquires no additional interest by
virtue of the felonious death of his cotenant, since that rationale
sanctions in effect the enhancement of property rights through
murder. For legal fictions cannot obscure the fact that before
the murder defendant, as a joint tenant, had to share the profits
of the property, and his right to complete ownership, unfettered
by the interests of a joint tenant, was contingent upon surviving his wife; whereas, after, and because of, his felonious act
that contingency was removed, and he became the sole owner of
the property, no longer sharing the profits with anyone nor
fearing the loss of his interest.
barred from acquiring benefits. Accord, Smith v. Greenburg, 121 Colo. 417, 218 P.2d

514 (1950). In these cases it is evident that legislatures have clearly declared public
policy with respect to disposition of property under felonious circumstances. The
murderer should not be permitted to prevent the application of such a statute by
committing suicide. In support of the latter view see Cowan v. Pleasant, 263 S.W.2d
494 (Ky. 1954); Nat'l. City Bank v. Bledsoe, 237 Ind. 130, 144 N.E.2d 710 (1957).
8

' Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N.Y.S. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1918); Brierbrauer
v. Moran, 244 App. Div. 87, 279 N.Y.S. 176 (4th Dep't. 1935); Accord, Vesey v.
Vesey, 237 Minn. 295, 54 N.W.2d 385 (1952)
9
Barnett v. Couey, 244 Mo. App. 913, 27 S.W.2d 757 (1930) ; Grose v. Holland 357 Mo.
874, 211 S.W.2d 464 (1948).
"Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1951); Hogan v. Martin, 52 So. 2d 806
(Fla. 1951).
"Cowan v. Pleasant, note 17 supra.
2Nat'l. City Bank v. Bledsoe, note 17 supra.
'Goldsmith v. Pearce, 345 Mich. 176, 75 N.W.2d 810 (1956).
2'Bradley v. Fox, 7 Ill. 2d 106, 129 N.E.2d 699 (1955).
"Abbey v. Lord, 168 Cal. App. 2d 499, 336 P.2d 226 (1959). In this case a husband
who murdered his wife was held to be entitled only to the amount of property which
he had contributed to the joint tenancy. This was not an equal division since the
husband had only contributed one-third.
"Bradley v. Fox, note 24 supra at 705.
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The Illinois court concluded that the murderer "destroyed" his right
of survivorship, lawfully retaining only his half-interest in the joint
property.
The effect of dividing the joint property is to eliminate the element
of survivorship. To accomplish this by means of a legal rationalization
which will harmonize with traditional property law concepts, these
courts treat the unlawful act as a severance by operation of law. At
common law, the creation and continuance of a joint tenancy required
four co-existing unities: time, title, interest, and possession.2 7 Any destruction of these unities operated as a severance of the joint tenancy,
converting it into a tenancy in common and extinguishing the right of
survivorship. Voluntary severance is caused by one tenant selling his
half-interest, by a partition, or by a divorce. The felonious killing of one
joint owner by the other also destroys these unities. 28 Therefore, the
29
unlawful act of murder operates to imply a severance.
Severance divides joint property into beneficial interests, which are
inheritable by the heirs of the respective tenants. This result is demonstrated in Bradley v. Fox, where the Illinois court held the husbandmurderer to be a tenant in common with the heir-at-law of the murdered
30
wife.
The status of title to joint property presents a more difficult problem because the survivor was vested with title before the cotenant's
death. In equity, a murderer may be prevented from acquiring beneficial
interests but not legal title. In the first case in which the issue was
presented, the Missouri court stated:31
Conceding, but not deciding, that full legal title may pass by
the fact of survivorship, yet, because of the unconscionable mode
of its acquisition, a court of equity, as here, should and will treat
[the murderer] as a constructive trustee. In any event . . . there
is a severance . . . [and the] property may well be treated as
held by tenants in common.
The Missouri court utilized the constructive trust theory as an expedient remedy to solve the problem of title. The trend of authority has
followed this reasoning, regarding the murderer as a constructive trustee of title to half of the joint property for the benefit of the victim's
estate. The Indiana court has stated that a division of joint property
3' 2
is "most compatible with common law and equitable principles.'
§ 283 (3d ed. 1940).
"The marital relation is the essential ingredient of a tenancy by the entirety, and the
cases which involve this type of property reason that severance results from the
unlawful destruction of the marriage. See, e.g., Goldsmith v. Pearce, note 23 supra.
2'TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY

'In Barnett v. Couey, note 19 supra, the Missouri court said: "To qualify as a survivor, one must not only be a survivor in fact, but must also be a survivor in contemplation of law ....
the [death] must be in the ordinary course of events and
subject only to the vicissitudes of life.'' Likewise, in Bradley v. Fox, note 24 supra
at 705, the Illinois court said: "One of the implied conditions of the [joint tenancy]
is that neither party will acquire the interest of the other by murder."
0
' See note 24 supra.
Barnett v. Couey, note 19 supra at 760.
82Nat'l.
City Bank v. Bledsoe, note 17 supra at 715.
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In the instant case, the result is consistent with this trend of authority because the Montana court divided the joint property into beneficial
interests. However, the Montana court did not arrive at its reasoning by
causing the murder to operate as a severance by operation of law. Instead the court eliminated the element of survivorship by finding a reservation in the survivorship statute that a man cannot benefit by his
own wrong.
The reasoning of the Montana court is not in line with the recent
trend of authority in one aspect because it effectuated the division of the
joint property by construing the survivorship statute, rather than by
utilizing common law property principles. However, either rationale
recognizes public policy and necessarily violates traditional concepts of
joint ownership. Whether the doctrine that a man cannot benefit by his
own wrong is applied to joint ownership by one theory or another is less
important because the results are the same.
In the instant case the pleading brought only the wife's half-interest
in the joint property into issue. The Montana court therefore left open
the issue of whether a murderer can be prevented from acquiring a larger
interest than his own half-interest.
Where the murderer has not committed suicide and the victim's
estate has claimed an interest larger than half, some courts impose a
constructive trust upon all of the joint property. The murderer is then
permitted to retain only a beneficial life-interest in half of the joint
property. 33 Under this theory, 34 the "contingent" right of survivorship
cannot be defeated by one tenant murdering another. In Neiman v.
Hurff,35 it was "conclusively presumed" that the victim survived the
murderer, who had prevented the natural determination of survivorship.
3

Colton v. Wade, 32 Del. Ch. 122, 80 A.2d 923 (1951); Neiman v. Hurff, 11 N.J. 55,
93 A.2d 345 (1952) ; In re Perry's Estate, 256 N.O. 65, 123 S.E.2d 99 (1961) ; In re
Hawkin's Estate, 213 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1961).

3This view has been adopted by

RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION

§

188 (1937), and ad-

vocated by Professor Scott, 4 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 493.2 (2d ed. 1956). It has been
enacted by several states, see, e.g., S. D. CODE § 56.0505 (1939). See also Wade,
Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, note 2
supra.
"Equity therefore conclusively presumes for the purpose of working out justice, that
the decedent would have survived the wrongdoer. In no other way can complete justice
be done and the criminal prevented from profiting through his crime." Neiman v.
Hurff, note 33 supra at 348. In this case the New Jersey court rejected the reasoning of an earlier decision where it had used mortality tables to ascertain which tenant
would have survived to the whole. In that case the court determined that the murderer would have survived anyway, and therefore he took the joint property subject
to the commuted value of the life-interest of the other tenant. Sherman v. Weber,
113 N.J. Eq., 451, 167 Atl. 517 (1933). This latter view is advocated by Professor
Bogert, but no decisions have been controlled by these subjective considerations. 3
BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 478 (2d ed. 1960). But see, Bryant v. Bryant, 193
N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927).
3As applied in a murder-suicide situation see In re King, 261 Wis. 266, 52 N.W.2d
885 (1952). In that case the court held that the victim's survivorship right continued in her estate, becoming operative when the murderer committed suicide.
Nothing remained to pass into the murder 's estate. This view's manifest unfairness to
the murderer's heirs has prevented its acceptance. One court has observed: "No
useful purpose would be served to reconcile our conclusion [division of joint property]
with . . . the finely spun legalistic theories . . . holding that the heirs of either the
Cowan v.
wrongdoer, or those of the one murdered, take all of the property."
Pleasant, 263 S.W.2d 494, 496 (Ky. 1954).
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Since the murderer was entitled to half of the joint property before the
killing, he could retain the benfits of this interest. However, the doctrine
that a man cannot benefit by his own wrong prevents the murderer from
acquiring not only the victim's half-interest, but also the victim's survivorship right. This view differs from the instant case because there is
no division of the joint property into inheritable interests; the victim's
36
estate inherits all of the property.
It is submitted that the Montana court adopted a solution which
compromises conflicting considerations raised by the murder and suicide
of joint owners. 37 On the one hand, the murderer is not permitted to
benefit his estate by acquiring the victim's half-interest. On the other,
the victim's estate is not deprived of property by the enforcement of the
murderer's survivorship right. In addition, the decision does not punish
the murderer's innocent heirs by denying their right to inherit all of the
joint property, but pragmatically states that justice and fairness are best
38
served by allowing the victim's heirs to take half of the joint property.
JOSEPH E. REBER

DETERMINATION

OF

INSANITY-OLD

PROBLEM

REQUIRES

A

NEW

AP-

rROACH.-In 1962 the defendant shot his wife and another woman, killing
his wife. Upon an information for first degree murder, he pleaded the
defense of insanity. The plea was based upon two grounds: (1) a history
of serious mental illness which dated from 1944; and (2) that the alleged
crime was the result of mental illness inasmuch as the defendant was
suffering from the delusion that his wife and the other woman were
carrying on illicit relations. The jury, under instructions from the court,
pronounced the accused legally sane at the time of the act and convicted
him. On appeal by the defendant to the Montana Supreme Court, held,
affirmed. The instructions of the trial court containing the right-wrong
and irresistible impulse tests presented the jury with the correct standard for determining insanity. State v. Noble, 384 P.2d 504 (Mont. 1963).
(A dissent by Mr. Justice Doyle condemned these tests as being outdated.)
Although a perfect test for insanity may never be developed, both
society and the courts have struggled to establish an adequate standard
to separate "criminals" from persons who are mentally irresponsible for
37Where a murderer does not commit suicide, the Montana court may be asked to
impose a constructive trust on all of the joint property, and permit the murderer to
retain only a life-interest in his half. The reasoning of the instant case would not
support this solution. It recognizes that a murderer cannot benefit by his felonious
act and thereby acquire the deceased's share of the property held jointly. This
benefit entails only the ''half-interest" of the victim, and does not entend to the
victim's survivorship right.
-In the absence of clear proof of which tenant died first it is unrealistic to enforce
the survivorship right. The facts of the instant case indicate that there was a
nominal time gap between the murder and the suicide. A lapse of several minutes
should not result in exclusive heirship. Under such circumstances the same result
could have been reached in the instant case by presuming that the deaths were
simultaneous. As provided in R.C.M. 1947, § 91-425, the joint property would descend
to the heirs of the respective tenants.
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